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Introduction: An unprecedented crisis? 
  
Unprecedented. Whatever we read about Covid-19, the word unprecedented is not far away: whether in 
describing policy choices, the daily death tolls, the scale of upheaval, or the challenges that await a 
readjusting world.  This paper takes an alternative view: if not unpredictable, the crisis unfolding in the 
United Kingdom (UK) is not unprecedented. Rather, it is foretold in accounts of successive animal health 
crises. In the UK at least, social studies of biosecurity and animal disease management provide an 
‘anticipatory logic’ - a mirror to the unfolding human catastrophe of Covid-19, providing few surprises. And 
yet, these accounts appear to be routinely ignored in the narrative of Covid-19 or as social scientists have 
sought to claim a place at the disease control table alongside traditional forms of expertise like 
epidemiology. Do social studies of animal disease really have no value when it comes to guiding and 
assessing responses to Covid-19? Following Rosenberg’s (1989, p.3) description of epidemics as a 
‘dramaturgic event’, we answer this question by firstly describing the narrative arc of the UK’s approach to 
managing Covid-19. We then overlay findings from social studies of animal disease to reveal the warnings 
they provided for a pandemic like Covid-19. We then reflect on the reasons why these studies have been 
paid minimal attention and the extent to which the failure to learn from these lessons of animal health 
management signals a failure of the One Health agenda. 
  
Covid-19 in the UK 
 
Rosenburg (1989, p.2) describes epidemics as a dramaturgic form, following a plot line ‘of increasing 
revelatory tension, move to a crisis of individual and collective character, then drift towards closure’. In 
doing so, this narrative arc ‘illuminat[es] fundamental patterns of social value and institutional practice’ 
(ibid.). The responses to Covid-19 in the UK share Rosenberg’s archetypal epidemic plotline: four key 
stages that are organised around the concept of the ‘lockdown’, the primary strategy adopted by the 
government to manage the spread of the virus (see figure 1). The acts to this lockdown drama are described 
below: 
 
1. Evading lockdown 
For Rosenberg (p.4), the ‘progressive revelation’ of an epidemic ensures that denial characterises the first 
stage of an epidemic: ‘bodies must accumulate…before officials acknowledge what can no longer be 
ignored’. The UK government’s response followed a similar pattern:  through late-february and early-march, 
it came under increasing pressure to act as cases in nearby countries expanded exponentially. The 
response, released on March 3rd (Department for Health and Social Care, 2020), was to evade draconian 
measures and instead ‘contain, delay, research and mitigate’. Evasion was based on an understanding of 
individual rather than collective behaviour during emergencies (Drury et al, 2020). Firstly, the idea of 
‘behavioural fatigue’ was used to argue that a lockdown would not be effective because it would be 
unacceptable to the public, who would become tired of restrictions and behave in potentially hazardous 
ways (Jetten et al, 2020). Secondly, the idea of ‘herd immunity’ was used in cautioning against a full lock-
down. The Prime Minister announced that a balanced approach to protecting the National Health Service 
(NHS) would mean some people would have to take coronavirus ‘on the chin’. More scientifically, the 
government’s Chief Scientist suggested that herd immunity would broaden and flatten the epidemic peak. 
Individual responsibility and a sense of duty to ‘do the right thing’ was tasked with defeating Covid-19. Thus, 
rather than government imposed containment measures, such as banning mass gatherings and closing 
schools, it was members of the public who took these decisions.  
 
 
 
2. Entering lockdown 
If turning to ‘rational understanding of phenomenon in terms that promise control’, represents the next stage 
in Rosenberg’s plotline (p.5), this was made palpable in the UK’s adoption of lockdown measures by the 
release of epidemiological modelling in mid-March (Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, 2020). These 
models estimated that the containment approach would lead to 250,000 deaths (Scally et al., 2020). A week 
later, the lockdown was announced, with policymakers emphasising that lockdown decisions were reliant 
on ‘the’ science and the rate of infection (known as the R number). The message to the public was clear: 
‘stay home, protect the NHS, save lives’. The approach reflected a dramatic shift away from relying on 
individual freedom, and highlighted the government’s centralised scientific infrastructure involved in 
controlling disease. Whilst the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) and its sub-groups like 
the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling (SPI-M) had been advising the government since the 
start, these scientists appeared at daily press briefings, and their advice deferred to in the exclusionary 
narrative of ‘the’ science. Devolved approaches fared less well, reflected in the abandoning of localised test 
and trace methodologies that had worked well in other countries (Scally et al., 2020). 
  
3. Enduring lockdown 
Accompanying this rational understanding, the third act of an epidemic involves routines and rituals and the 
imposition of ‘familiar frames of explanation and logically consequent policies’ (Rosenberg, p.7). 
Throughout the UK’s lockdown, a daily government briefing became a scientific stage for ‘the’ science and 
the ‘R number’ to reassure the public of the government’s strategy (cf. Hilgartner, 2000). Targets were set 
to recruit 18,000 contact tracers, to test 100,000 people a day and to supply millions of pieces of personal 
protective equipment (PPE). Back-stage the reality was messier with double-counting of tests creating what 
leading statistician Professor Sir David Spiegelhalter called ‘pure number theatre’. If this dented public 
confidence in the government’s handling of the pandemic, it was a mere foretaste. Firstly, a change in 
messaging from ‘stay home’ to ‘stay alert’ created confusion amongst the public. Secondly, the UK’s former 
chief scientific advisor, David King, established an ”Independent SAGE”, with a more diverse scientific 
membership, to address criticisms of the lack of scientific transparency and trustworthiness. Then, news 
broke that Dominic Cummings - the Prime Minister’s chief advisor - and his family had broken rules.  Public 
trust in government plummeted, the devolved governments in Scotland and Wales emphasised their 
differences, and Cummings was used by the public to justify breaking lockdown rules.  
 
4. Exiting lockdown 
Whilst epidemics may end with a whimper, their ending also prompts moral judgment: to ask if the ‘dead 
have died in vain?’ (Rosenberg, p.9). The ending of the lockdown, began on May 13th, reaching its zenith 
on ‘super Saturday’ when English pubs reopened on July 4th. Yet this stage is also marked by ambiguity, 
for example through increasing organisational complexity. This includes the establishment of a Joint 
Biosecurity Centre, to advise on the UK’s coronavirus ‘alert levels’ as part of a new Covid-19 alert system. 
Chaired by a member of the security services, Covid-19 is reframed as a matter of security and its 
relationship to existing public health infrastructure is unclear. Organisational complexity is demonstrated 
too by the reliance on a range of private organisations (such as Serco) to deliver contact tracing or create 
contact tracing apps. As scientists took a backseat following their daily appearances, politicians took control 
of the recovery, seeking to ‘build back better’ and restore the economy. The spectre of a second-wave,  
super-spreading events in abattoirs and  local lockdowns, suggests the final curtain is yet to fall.  
    
 
The Anticipatory Logic of Animal Health 
If epidemics like Covid-19 follow familiar plotlines, can it be described as unexpected and unprecedented? 
If the Covid-19 epidemic narrative reflects institutional forms and cultural assumptions, it also reflects how 
understandings of disease control are too narrowly framed and ignore important lessons from the 
management of animal disease in the UK over the last 20 years. The outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) in the UK in 2001, for example, focused government attention on preparedness planning, not least 
because the inability of the government to handle such an outbreak had already been predicted 
(Drummond, 1999). As Anderson (2010) argues, ‘precaution, preemption and preparedness’ have become 
obsessions, giving rise to ‘anticipatory logics’, and practices of calculating the future to instill resilience 
across government organisations and responsible conduct amongst the public. Bearing witness to the 
management of animal disease - its social practices and consequences - can be seen as an anticipatory 
logic itself. Indeed, as the discourse of ‘One Health’ suggests (AVMA, 2008), there should be much to learn 
and apply from animal to human disease management. For the narrative arc of Covid-19, what would this 
anticipatory logic have told us, and potentially pre-empted?  
Firstly, arguments over the role of epidemiological modelling should be expected because of the way space, 
subjectivity and politics are encoded within it. The experience of FMD in 2001 highlighted different political 
choices on which to base decisions. For some, a pre-emptive cull of animals was not only illegal, but socially 
and economically regressive due to the abstract nature of modelling (Campbell and Lee, 2003). Other 
studies of FMD modelling have pointed to the geographical disconnect between computer modelers in 
distant cities, compared with the situated and nuanced understandings of other experts (such as field 
veterinarians) whose connection with place provides a different understanding of disease transmission 
(Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2004). These differences are also tied to spatial styles for governing: command 
and control is associated with governing from a distance using models that treat space as universal and 
knowledge as mobile (Leach and Scoones, 2013). By contrast, devolved approaches are associated with 
proximate experts and expertise that is situated and variable. Clearly, these distinctions are disciplinary as 
well as spatial. Thus, different epidemiological subjectivities are endorsed and/or marginalised by choices 
made by governments when managing disease (Enticott and Ward, 2020). The management of Covid-19 
displays the same pattern: command and control through modelling and the marginalisation of local and 
regional health knowledges. In animal health, the effect of this disciplinary and social marginalisation can 
have long-lasting effects. These studies also point to a better future that recognises how epidemiological 
knowledge is not bounded but created in a borderland in which approaches overlap (Hinchliffe et al, 2013) 
and by integrating participatory forms of modelling (Scoones et al, 2017), more inclusive forms of disease 
control can be developed. 
Secondly, the collapse of trust in the UK government’s approach to governing Covid-19 was foretold 
through the management of animal disease. Starting with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), 
government failures in communicating scientific uncertainty (Jasanoff, 1996) have contributed to a lack of 
public confidence in the handling of disease. BSE was not an isolated incident: the public were similarly 
alarmed by the handling of FMD (Poortinga et al, 2004), whilst farmers were similarly distrustful of attempts 
to manage bTB. Distrust may stem from the contrast between different forms of understanding disease and 
the distinctions between scientific and experiential knowledges (Maye et al, 2014). As Cassidy (2015) 
describes, recourse to ‘big science’ as a means of resolving disputes that rest on values rarely succeeds 
and often has the opposite effect. Part of the problem here is communicating the distinction between 
population and individual medicine and the creation of what Rose (1984) calls ‘the prevention paradox’. As 
studies of animal disease show, where population disease interventions fail to correspond to individual 
experiences, exceptions to the rules and conflict with cultural norms drives mistrust of government and 
fatalism. For Covid-19, the reliance on the R number has the same problems. Not only does it misrepresent 
that epidemics are multiple and vary between sites (for example: community, hospital and care homes), but 
the universal presentation fails to reflect how the public have a geographically nuanced understanding of 
disease risks and transmission (Enticott, 2008). 
Thirdly, the challenges of creating testing regimes and technologies to track and trace infections are well 
understood within studies of animal disease and agriculture. The extent to which testing can deliver on 
promises set for it will reflect its social organisation. For example, in the management of bTB, who conducts 
tests has come to reflect broad political-economic choices that have infiltrated the management of animal 
disease. Presumed efficiencies of the private sector have led to the contracting out of disease surveillance 
but this has not been without consequences. The close ‘relational distance’ between farmers and their own 
veterinarians paid by government to regulate their clients has raised questions over the ‘accuracy’ of 
interpretation of test results, as a result of testers acting as field-level epidemiologists and taking local 
factors into account (Enticott, 2017). Similarly, for Covid-19, if test results are to trigger the use and 
commitment to new track and trace technologies, then these will rely on more than just test results. As 
Higgins et al (2018) show, acting on biosecurity information involves a different set of behavioural logics 
than those that are imagined by regulators. The cultural expectation of what counts as ‘good farming’ and 
the ‘good farmer’ can undermine official guidance on avoiding animal disease or disclosing suspicious 
symptoms (Shortall et al, 2018; Naylor et al, 2018). Shaping conduct by governing through individualistic 
biosecurity subjectivities (Barker, 2010) written into official documents and technologies has limits: use of 
biosecurity practices and reporting of suspicious deaths and sightings is not simply a matter of ‘staying 
alert’, but is emergent from a complex relationship of social, economic and environmental relationships 
(Brugere et al, 2017; Palmer et al, 2009; Bronnet et al 2014; Barnes et al, 2015). 
Finally, studies of the management of animal disease highlights the mobility of disease experts and 
expertise. Whilst the psycho-social impacts of eradicating animal disease upon animal disease experts 
(Bailey et al, 2006; Hood and Seedsman, 2004) may foretell how medical doctors and health care staff will 
respond to their own trauma of treating Covid-19, one likely response will be to exit the profession or migrate 
to other countries as a form of recovery (Enticott, 2018). In fact, whilst the UK’s initial approach to managing 
Covid-19 through herd immunity may reflect a form of ‘British Exceptionalism’, animal disease management 
has recently been anything but international. Policy documents clearly reflect the international spread of 
logics and technologies of disease management, such as the neolberal forms of responsibilisation and cost-
sharing and its technologies of risk-based trading developed in Australia and New Zealand. Nevertheless, 
whilst the global flow of ideas, experts and expertise appears to continue to shape how disease control is 
imagined, it is equally true that the globalisation of disease regulations has not been met without resistance, 
as politicians seek to protect their own interests (Higgins and Dibden, 2011; Maye et al, 2012). In this sense, 
in the face of global consensus over the appropriate tools and methods to deploy, the UKs approach finds 
some precedent in the management of animal disease. 
 
Conclusion: Whose Failure? 
 
In traversing Covid-19’s narrative arc, we wish to make three related points. The first is that it seems that 
social studies of animal disease provide a mirror of clarity to the narrative arc of Covid-19. If paying attention 
to the management of animal disease provides an ‘anticipatory logic’, it seems to be one worth paying 
attention to in order to provide the kind of ‘situational awareness’ required to help prevent mistakes from 
being made in future pandemics. Social studies of animal disease add to the ‘ecology of knowledges’ that 
are required to resolve problems where ‘the facts are uncertain, the social stakes are high, decisions are 
urgent and values are in dispute’ - what Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993, p.744) define as ‘post-normal 
science’. The warnings and advice that social studies of animal disease can signal may therefore help to 
broaden institutions ‘sense-making’ capabilities, providing different perspectives and alternatives, and as 
Weick (1995) puts it, to drop familiar tools and develop new ones.  
 
Secondly, there is also a broader lesson for the kinds of social science that can be used here too. One 
difference between the handling of FMD in 2001 and Covid-19 has been the rise of behavioural science. 
The pandemic has provided an opportunity for behavioural scientists to reframe disease management as a 
behavioural problem and claim a place alongside epidemiologists. Their claims of expertise have, however, 
routinely ignored the social science of animal disease. Thus, van Bavel et al’s (2020) review of the role of 
social science in managing Covid-19 ignores social research on the human dimensions of managing animal 
disease. Equally, there is a danger that the social sciences have been narrowly framed: aligned with 
disciplining the individual perspective of ‘nudge’ behavioural economics rather than acknowledging 
community action (Drury et al, 2020). Alternatively, these attempts to provide social scientific certainty, 
ignore the messy realities of disease and the need to understand the kinds of social work required to make 
disease control possible (Hinchliffe, 2015).  
 
This narrow definition leads to our final question: why have lessons from animal disease studies been 
ignored? This seems all the more apposite given the extent to which the discourse of ‘One Health’ has 
become ubiquitous in anticipation of the next pandemic (Craddock and Hinchliffe, 2015). In response to 
Covid-19, was it most appropriate for veterinary experts to help on the front line of the human medical crisis, 
donate their PPE from the sidelines, or in the face of a labour crisis, to focus on those dimensions of health 
(such as veterinary public health) that their specialism allowed? With Chief Veterinary Officers suggesting 
the latter, the experience of Covid-19 seems to speak to the broader limitations of the One Health 
movement, or at least, reinforce a demarcation and segregation between its various components. Indeed, 
social scientific studies of One Health already reveal the extent to which understandings of even an 
epidemic are socially constructed, distributed and laden with power relations (Craddock, 2015; Tirado et al 
2015). Or, as Hinchliffe (2015, p.28) suggests, visions of One Health can reduce complexity by focussing 
narrowly on contamination and transmission, thereby effacing the ‘local, contingent and practical 
engagements that make health possible’. Rather than this version of One Health, argues Hinchliffe, what is 
preferable is a version that understands the social work that is required to make health work within 
increasingly complex disease ecologies. Whilst social studies of animal disease offer an immediate mirror 
into new and emerging infections like Covid-19, it is towards this longer lasting social understanding of 
health that might be its greatest contribution. 
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